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## QUINE'S COROLLARY ON ANALYSIS AND HIS NOTION OF *PARAPHRASE*

*Abstract:* The purpose of this dissertation is to explain away the perplexity that arises from comparing the alleged negative consequences that Quine's criticism of analyticity has for conceptual analysis with the real job that is done by the philosopher. The idea whereby the philosopher must abandon analysis, because there is no analysis that is interesting for the philosophical inquiry, is incompatible with the evidence according to which the philosopher does something different, say, than the natural scientist, given that he can supposedly work "from the armchair". Such tension between what 'must-be' and what 'it is' regarding the philosophical contemporary inquiry is the philosophical problem to discuss in this paper. The resolution, as will be seen, rests on a certain conception of conceptual analysis that is divorced from analyticity, and thereby is not condemned by Quine's corollary on analysis. We shall argue that this particular conception of conceptual analysis is the notion of 'paraphrase' as it is understood by Quine and Frank Jackson.

*Keywords:* Conceptual analysis, analytic/synthetic distinction, Quine.

## EL COROLARIO DE QUINE ACERCA DEL ANÁLISIS Y SU NOCIÓN DE *PARÁFRASIS*

*Resumen:* El propósito de esta disertación es disipar la perplejidad que surge al comparar las supuestas consecuencias negativas que las críticas de Quine a la analiticidad tienen para el análisis conceptual con el trabajo real hecho por el filósofo. La idea según la cual el filósofo debe abandonar el análisis porque no hay algún análisis que sea interesante para la investigación filosófica es incompatible con la evidencia de acuerdo con la cual el filósofo hace algo diferente, digamos, de lo que hace el científico natural, dado que puede trabajar presuntamente "desde el sillón". Tal tensión entre 'lo que debe ser' y 'lo que es' con respecto a la inquisición filosófica contemporánea es el pro-

blema a discutir en este artículo. La solución, como se verá, se apoya en una cierta noción de análisis conceptual que está divorciada de la analiticidad, y por tanto, no está condenada por el corolario de Quine acerca del análisis. Argumentaremos que esta concepción particular del análisis conceptual es la noción de ‘paráfrasis’ tal como es entendida por Quine y Frank Jackson.

*Palabras clave:* análisis conceptual, distinción analítico-sintético, Quine.

### I. *Quine's corollary on analysis*

The plausible (or whatever possible) validity and actual scope of Quine's criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction cannot be measured clearly, given the open and everlasting debate around (a non-vicious way to explain) the existence of genuine analytic statements. Even more, Kripke's triple differentiation of the analytic/synthetic, a priori/a posteriori and necessary/contingent distinctions showed that, whatever analyticity is, it is comprehensible that it is not coextensive with apriority or necessity, and therefore it became possible to think in the remote existence of analytic statements. But the undermining challenge that Quine raised not only consisted in the extreme assessment that there are no analytic sentences, but, furthermore, that if they existed at all they must be trivial, and so scientifically uninterestingly<sup>1</sup>. Putnam claimed in the same vein that analytic statements cannot bake philosophical bread nor wash philosophical windows<sup>2</sup>. Presently, Timothy Williamson claims that the assertion of the existence of analytic statements is true given that “(...) we can generally achieve a rough consensus (...)”<sup>3</sup> about the analytic/synthetic distinction. But, then again, this should be trivial given that, as he states, there is no philosophically interesting notions of analyticity due to the fact that such conceptions lack “(...) the epistemological payoff which might be hoped from them.”<sup>4</sup> The question is what sort of theoretical relevance does the analytic/synthetic distinction put forward, and no good answer seems to be anywhere near. Then, supposing that Quine and his followers agree in rejecting the dogma about the value of analyticity in relation to the philosophical inquiry, and supposing that such agreement is pertinent, the ques-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Quine, W. V. O., “Carnap and Logical Truth,” in *Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976, §II.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Putnam, H., “The Analytic and the Synthetic,” in *Philosophical Papers*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, vol. 2, p. 67.

<sup>3</sup> Williamson, T., “Conceptual Truth”, in *The Aristotelian Society*, London, Wiley-Blackwells, 2006, Supplementary volume 80, p. 9

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*.

tion that pops up concerns the damage that such assumption does to the conceptual analysis program, especially, the one that recognizes explicitly the existence and value of some conception of analyticity to philosophy.

According to Quine, it derives as a corollary from his global attack to analyticity and its associated conceptions (that is: synonymy, interchangeability, intension, definition and semantical rule amongst others) that conceptual analysis based on the analytic/synthetic distinction must be discarded. This corollary on conceptual analysis can be expressed by the following reasoning which is an instance of the *Modus Tollens*:

### **Quine's corollary on analysis:**

- √ Conceptual analysis implies the analytic-synthetic distinction.
- √ There is no –valid or philosophically interesting– analytic/synthetic distinction.
- ∴ Conceptual analysis must be turned down.

If the premises are true, then it would make no sense to make conceptual analysis at all. This is, conceptual analysis is committed to the analytic/synthetic distinction such that if there is not an analytic/synthetic distinction, conceptual analyses must be discarded altogether. But this is not what has happened after Quine's negation of the analytic/synthetic distinction. In fact, most of the philosophers that told other philosophers to stand up from their armchairs did not stand up. In general, the philosophers that accepted Quine's corollary about analysis did not left the armchair. In the end, most of them went on making conceptual analysis (one way or another, in some proportion, etc.). But of what kind of conceptual analysis are we talking about?

*Conceptual analysis* stands for a variety of methods (some of which are quite incompatible among themselves) that had been identified with the mechanism that philosophy has traditionally deployed for resolving philosophical problems. Nowadays, since the second half of the twentieth century, the traditional conception of conceptual analysis has been radically diminished, in particular, through the problems that Quine and his followers formulated against the intelligibility, usefulness or interest of analyticity for philosophy. Furthermore, we argue that it is also true that Quine's diminishing of conceptual analysis through the refusal of analyticity did not have the same reception by the philosophical community as his criticism of analyticity. Why is this?

A renewed examination of these issues may show that the controversy around conceptual analysis is not as clear or conclusively resolved as perhaps the one that refers to the relevance of analyticity for the philosophical inquiry. Ever since Quine introduced his corollary on analysis there has been philosophers who have replied to his challenges. Grice and Strawson, for example, intended to show that Quine's criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction did not justify his rejection of it<sup>5</sup>. They argued that the general previous presupposition in favor of the analytic/synthetic distinction is not damaged by the futile attempts that had been offered to clear it up<sup>6</sup>. On the contrary, a good amount of the effort that is necessary to defend the 'first dogma' proceeds from the interest in the analysis which is required to clarify such a distinction. Grice and Strawson admitted that Quine's intention of criticizing analyticity and its associated notions was a clear sign that a general satisfactory account of those concepts was needed. But they contradicted the opinion whereby Quine's attacks to analyticity justify the negation of conceptual analysis as a futile methodology. The point for them was that the negative assessment of the role of conceptual analysis in philosophy contradicts –or at least is incompatible with– the very criticism of analyticity as an 'unclear notion'. It may well be that analyticity and its related notions must be criticized in order to elaborate better conceptual clarifications. Nevertheless, the rejection of analyticity does not imply the denial of *all* types of analysis. Clarifications are necessary and are indeed associated with conceptual analyses. Thus, someone may argue that Quine's underestimation of conceptual analysis's methodology conceived specifically as a group of methods identified with each other by some essential core of analytic truths is based on an unjustified generalization.

Our interest here, however, is not to discuss Grice's and Strawson's argument in favor of analyticity and conceptual analysis. Rather, we intend to show how, in the general context of replies to Quine, the philosophical community began taking for granted that if the analytic/synthetic distinction got resuscitated, conceptual analysis could thereby have a legitimate duty within the philosophical enterprise. If conceptual analysis is to be explained as a distinctive philosophical methodology, it then could be characterized as having especial virtues. Indeed, it is overtly agreed that the recuperation of the analytic/synthetic distinction is a precondition

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Grice, P., and Strawson, P., "In Defense of a Dogma", in *Studies in the Way of Words*, Grice P. (ed.), USA, Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 196.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 197.

to unleash several projects that engage in conceptual analysis<sup>7</sup>. Our goal, therefore, is to find out the possible escaping routes from this controversy.

Some philosophers have openly continued doing conceptual analysis without counting with an analytic/synthetic distinction. Certainly, in spite of their acceptance of Quine's corollary about analysis, these philosophers provide another kind of solution to the problem of conceptual analysis's legitimacy. They propose some notion of conceptual analysis, but they are not committed to the analytic/synthetic distinction. So, taking under consideration this possibility we now examine an example of this posture to see in what way conceptual analysis's validity can be explained without appealing to analyticity.

## II. *Frank Jackson's conception of analysis*

Frank Jackson is an actual proponent of conceptual analysis, this is, a method that can help explain a concept through the disposition of intuitions about possible cases. He foresees the criticism that could diminish his defense of conceptual analysis if this defense implied somehow a differentiation between analytic and synthetic judgments. Jackson's conception of conceptual analysis seeks to get a divorce from analyticity in such a way that it does not imply it. He shows that his notion of conceptual analysis need not be committed with analyticity by the fact that there is *information* provided by the intuitions about possible cases that analyses try to recover. The good or bad application of concepts and sentences to particulars and events is based on the fallibility of intuitions about possible cases. These intuitions are examples of things and events which we consider to fall under the extension of a given term or sentence. On the other hand, where someone was to say that the extension of the cases covered by two different concepts is the same (namely, in the case where two concepts are thought of as being co-extensive), like in the case of 'equilateral triangle' and 'equiangular triangle', Jackson is not inclined to subscribe the statement that a given sentence, "An equilateral triangle is an equiangular triangle", involves the same relevant concept<sup>8</sup>. So if there *is not*, generally speaking, conceptual identity involved in the sentences that express intuitions about possible cases, there are not either cases of conceptual analysis based on analytic statements that are required by Jackson.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Fodor, J. and Lepore, E., "Analyticity Again", in *The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language*, Devitt M. and Hanley R. (eds.), USA, Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Jackson, F., *From Metaphysics to Ethics. A Defense of Conceptual Analysis*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 34.

Now, the sense in which Jackson pays homage to Quine consists in his *practical* accordance with him concerning the rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction<sup>9</sup>, and also, in the compliance to his corollary on analysis. In Jackson's standpoint, his approach to conceptual analysis has been developed in such a way that it does not commit itself explicitly or implicitly to a robust distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. But it is still true that he disagrees with Quine in the discussion about whether it is *theoretically* possible to make sense of the analytic/synthetic distinction<sup>10</sup>. Anyway, it is not the case that Jackson's defense of conceptual analysis hangs in such a theoretic possibility. Regardless of the hypothetical possibility of making intelligible this distinction, and yet, accepting Quine's corollary on analysis, Jackson dispenses with the traditional account of analysis based on conceptual identity or synonymy. He identifies his notion of analysis with Quine's notion of 'paraphrase', which consists in the tracking of the approximate fulfillment of probable purposes for sentences<sup>11</sup>. Since analysis does not attempt to track down the identity of concepts but rather intends to clarify and explicate terms under the premise that *analysandum* and *analysans* are not the same concepts, no analytic statements are at stake in Jackson's vision of analysis. The *analysandum* is cleared up and then explicated necessarily by reference to distinct concepts. Thus, when we paraphrase a given concept in another vocabulary, it gets clarified through concepts of that other vocabulary in association to which one can ascribe to a concept in a sentence a probable task to fulfill.

Jackson is perfectly aware that conceptual analysis has dropped out of the recognition of the philosophical community<sup>12</sup>, even though this community does not deny in general that conceptual analysis is actually practiced in philosophy—in some way. This means that philosophers usually have a vague sense about what can be achieved by the use of conceptual analysis. Usually we do not distinguish between the diverse and prolific types of conceptual analyses that there are. Following Jackson, we argue that the polemic around conceptual analysis's validity arises because of the misconception of its nature although it really is not, as he says, the mysterious activity discredited by Quine<sup>13</sup>, i.e. an a priori processes that involves the sort of equivalence that identifies logically identical sentences among themselves. From his point of view, the controversy around the validity of conceptual analysis

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Quine, W. V. O., *Word and Object*, USA, The MIT Press, 1960, p. 224.

<sup>12</sup> Jackson, F., *From Metaphysics to...*, cit., preface, vii.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*.

is settled once this mysterious activity is put aside and, instead, one gets clear on the fact that paraphrases are evidently practiced. His allegation is that analysis is an activity familiar to everyone, philosophers and non-philosophers, although it has been conceived under different labels<sup>14</sup>. Jackson maintains that the doubts regarding the relevance of analysis to philosophy are the product of ill-conceived interpretations of the application of analysis in metaphysics. The fact of the matter is that not only philosophers work with conceptual analysis. In natural and social sciences it is equally employed. It is also true that the philosopher is who has invested most of his time making conceptual analysis. Anyhow, Jackson claims that the price paid for the rejection of analysis has cost the opportunity to refer to a set of important questions<sup>15</sup>; hence, we are prone to reexamine conceptual analysis's pertinence within philosophy's framework.

*The discussion of Jackson's proposal: Gilbert Harman's criticisms*

In the review that Gilbert Harman<sup>16</sup> makes of Jackson's "Armchair Metaphysics"<sup>17</sup>, he expresses his doubts about the possibility of carrying out an a priori analysis of 'good', 'knowledge' and other similar concepts. He says that such alleged 'analyses' carried out in the space of 'mental experiments' are not really immune to empiric refutation. Harman's criticism to Jackson consist in that there is an obvious and immediate difference between the paradigmatic cases of the a priori, such as the law of identity and the non-contradiction principle, on the one side, and on the other, the cases where concepts as 'good' and 'knowledge' are analyzed. In these latter cases, Harman argues, the "philosophical" analysis of concepts does not seem to derive from obvious axioms, in contrast with the first case. Thus, for him the problem with philosophical analysis is the uncertainty or fallibility of its results, in contrast with the results of the conceptual analyses of logicians and mathematicians. But Jackson's modest approach to conceptual analysis maintains, following Kripke<sup>18</sup>, that necessity and fallibility can coexist, so there would be no point in taking a radical-empiricist posture and stating that conceptual analyses are altogether useless because they are unnecessary

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>16</sup> Harman, G., *Reasoning, Meaning and Mind*, USA, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 138.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Jackson, F., "Armchair Metaphysics", in *Philosophy in Mind*, O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. and Michael, M. (eds.), Netherlands, Wolters Kluwer N.V., 1994.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Kripke, S., *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge, USA, Harvard University Press, 1980, p. 39.

and fallible. Anyhow, Harman tries to show that one does not have to take sides for radical empiricism to refute Jackson's approach to analysis. He says that is sufficient to believe, as moderate empiricists do, that there are a priori truths –such as the basic principles and definitions of logic– to see that “We do not normally have the sort of direct intuitive insight into the truth of philosophical analyses that we may seem to have into basic principles of logic.”<sup>19</sup> The point for him is that it is not the case that philosophical analyses can be demonstrated –in the rigorous sense–, this is, “(...) as following by obvious principles from obvious axioms.”<sup>20</sup> This raises the question about the sort of ‘a priori truth’ that the results of philosophical analyses are supposed to deliver.

Harman believes that any defense of the a priori/a posteriori distinction must imply (explicitly or implicitly) a dichotomy between analytic and synthetic statements. Now, Jackson's perspective is that conceptual analysis provides a priori results<sup>21</sup>. Therefore, Harman concludes that Jackson somehow distinguishes between analytic and synthetic truths. He says that the appeal to a knowledge that is acquired independently of the data of experience requires of an explication of the foundations: this is, “knowledge of P might depend on know-ledge of Q, and so-forth, eventually culminating in foundations that were either known a priori or deliverances of immediate conscious experience.”<sup>22</sup> According to Harman, the disapproval of foundationalism is tantamount to discrediting a priori knowledge, and vice versa<sup>23</sup>. He thinks like Quine that once foundationalism was rejected in philosophy, the viability of the a priori/a posteriori distinction was therefore denied. The decisive argument against foundationalism consisted in understanding that our beliefs are not structured *via* justificatory relationships<sup>24</sup>. Thus we are not in the need of justification unless there is a specific challenge to a part of our conceptual framework. One cannot doubt of the overall framework, nor can one repair completely at once the ship in which one is sailing<sup>25</sup>. The point is condensed by Davidson's claim that there cannot be such a thing as a ‘massive error’<sup>26</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> Harman, *Reasoning, Meaning, and...*, cit., p. 138.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Jackson, *From Metaphysics to...*, cit., p. 47.

<sup>22</sup> Harman, *Reasoning, Meaning, and...*, cit., p. 141.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Quine, *Word and Object*, cit., p. 4.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Davidson, D., “Radical Interpretation”, in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford, USA, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 125-139.



Harman stresses that there is no *philosophical* conceptual analysis. At least, there is no philosophical analysis that shares the same status as the mathematical conceptual analysis. Claiming that there are several types of definitions (the dictionary definitions, e.g., that try to capture ordinary meanings, or the definitions of numbers in terms of sets), he argues that if philosophical analyses exist at all they must be trivial, in the same sense that commonsense observations are useless to the increase of scientific knowledge. No matter what kind of definition one is dealing with, no definition has guaranteed a long-term epistemological status<sup>27</sup>. This means basically that a definition can vary as much as our beliefs about anything else can change<sup>28</sup>. There is not a sharp difference between changing what one means and changing what one believes<sup>29</sup>. Then definitions possess a short-term privileged status, but, as Harman notices, that status is shared by anything else that is assumed. If we are to make suppositions, we take them to be true as long as we are willing to suppose them thus<sup>30</sup>. Yet, there will normally be occasions in which any supposition could be revised because, as Quine sentenced, “no statement is immune to revision.”<sup>31</sup>

### *Jackson's replies to Harman*

Jackson is aware of Harman criticisms, and thereby he articulates in *From Metaphysics to Ethics* his notion of analysis in an independent way from the traditional concept of conceptual analysis. As we have seen, the methodology of conceptual analysis that he defends does not require of a robust distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, or even of an alleged tacit distinction. Harman makes Jackson's defense of conceptual analysis guilty of presupposing the analytic/synthetic distinction as a dichotomy between conceptual truths and substantial theoretical hypothesis<sup>32</sup>. If this were true, then Jackson would be blamable for thinking that Quine's corollary on analysis does not apply –negatively speaking– to his concept of analysis. But then again, this is false because Jackson<sup>33</sup> does not bases his global conception of analysis in any version of such a distinction, given that he

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Harman, *Reasoning, Meaning, and...*, cit., p. 141.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 141.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>31</sup> Quine, W. V. O., “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, in *From a Logical Point of View*, USA, Harvard University Press, 1953, p. 43.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Harman, *Reasoning, Meaning, and...*, cit., p. 141.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Jackson, F., *From Metaphysics to Ethics. A Defense of Conceptual Analysis*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998.

considers that intuitions are only *hypothesis* or *examples* which best make sense about possible cases. In Jackson's proposal there is not properly speaking conceptual truths in the sense of *analytic* truths, for instance, statements of conceptual identities or definitions which establish the cognitive synonymy of some given *analysandum* and some *analysans*. If the intuitions of which Jackson is speaking of are hypothesis which deliver to us *some* amount of information or empirical knowledge, then an analysis of such intuitions does not stay limited to a merely conceptual domain.

As we have noticed, Jackson claims that the method of conceptual analysis that he defends is very much similar to Quine's conception of 'paraphrase'. Quine said that the objective of paraphrasing "(...) would not be synonymy, but just approximate fulfillment of likely purposes of the original sentences."<sup>34</sup> In the same vein, Jackson stresses that "In neither case is synonymy to be claimed for the paraphrase. Synonymy, for sentences generally, is not a notion that we can readily make adequate sense of."<sup>35</sup> He reads Quine's paraphrase as the clarification, for example, of the conception of personal identity that offers a given theory appealing to a neighbor notion of personal identity sufficiently close to the conception of that theory<sup>36</sup>. This kind of analysis tracks a link between two notions of personal identity. Such paraphrase states the nexus according to the approximate purpose of an original sentence about personal identity which contains the relevant notion that is to be clarified. Is of noteworthy the fact that the nexus which is tracked down between the two different conceptions does not imply, in any sort of way, that those two notions are at bottom the same one, or what is the same, that they are conceptually identical. Analysis as paraphrase is not based on conceptual identity or on synonymy but, rather, is supported in intuitions easily recognizable as possible cases of, say, personal identity. To that extent, conceptual analysis attempts to re-make the connections that the sentences analyzed approximately ought to express according to their probable original purposes. In Jackson's view, *folke* intuitions are the ones that motivate those connections, given the common interests of speakers. When he refers to his example of the concept of personal identity, he says that the analysis of the notion of personal identity is done by a paraphrase which appeals to other closely related concepts that can help explain it. This is,

(...) a different but 'nearby' conception that does, or does near enough, the job we give personal identity in governing what we

<sup>34</sup> Quine, *Word and Object*, cit., p. 224.

<sup>35</sup> Jackson, *From Metaphysics to...*, cit., p. 159.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

care about, our personal relations, our social institutions of reward and punishment, and the like, and which is realized in our world.<sup>37</sup>

A neighboring notion can help characterize the concept personal identity: for example –Jackson claims–, the notion of the continuities between how persons are at various times<sup>38</sup>. The paraphrase according to this arguably fits the bill, “and so we should analyze personal identity in terms of such continuities. Again, what guides us is very like what guides the Quinean who refuses to talk of synonymy, but seeks paraphrases that do the jobs that need doing.”<sup>39</sup>

Jackson uses a modest and fallibilistic version of conceptual analysis. He actually agrees with Harman in regard to the fact that the analytic/synthetic distinction must be refused, and yet shows that it is possible to defend a notion of conceptual analysis (i.e. the conception of paraphrase) that Quine himself employed. According to this, there would be no contradiction in the acceptance of Quine's corollary on analysis and yet making use of the notion of paraphrase as a genuine method to clarify concepts. In Jackson's view, the fact that analysis is fallible and nonetheless a priori is not contradictory. Following Kripke<sup>40</sup>, Jackson separates the analytic/synthetic, the a priori/a posteriori, the necessary/contingent and the certain/fallible distinctions as four different, non-coextensive dichotomies belonging to unlike domains. Thus he can say that there is nothing sacrosanct about *folk* theory, and that new considerations which arise at the light of new empirical discoveries about ourselves and the world can lead us to modify our theories<sup>41</sup>.

Let us summarize. Clearly Jackson is not an advocate of conceptual identity or cognitive synonymy. He agrees that one of the few points on which almost all philosophers agree on is that there is no analytic/synthetic distinction worth making in philosophy. On the other hand, Jackson's proposal depends on an activity that is supported by Quine: as he claims, “The point remains that, in practice, the role I am recommending for conceptual analysis will often be *very* like the role Quine gives the notion of paraphrase.”<sup>42</sup> Now, for our purposes, it is not necessary to deny the intelligibility or reality of the analytic/synthetic distinction. Is enough

<sup>37</sup> Jackson, *From Metaphysics to...*, cit., p. 45.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, cit., pp. 34-39.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Jackson, *From Metaphysics to...*, cit., p. 44.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

to affirm that, whatever it is an ‘analytic judgment’, a genuine conceptual analysis does not deal with it, nor does ultimately reveal it. Once again, a good way to put the issue of the lack of relevant consequences or sterility of philosophical researches that head themselves exclusively to develop an account for the existence of analytic truths –either for formal languages such as logic, or in the field natural languages, for example– is contained in the famous words of Hillary Putnam, who claims that analytic statements would “...cut no philosophical ice... bake no philosophical bread and wash no philosophical windows.”<sup>43</sup> Hence, in spite of its traditional reference to analyticity, conceptual analysis must not be about identifying concepts between themselves but, rather, it must be of another nature, where different concepts are approximately held together for elucidatory purposes. Analytic truths, if they exist at all, are not of any interest for conceptual analyses. Is worth noticing that, in some sense, we are denying the first premise of Quine’s corollary about analysis, that is, we reject the assertion according to which *all* conceptual analyses imply the analytic/synthetic distinction, and therefore, we deny the conclusion whereby the refusal of analyticity implies abandoning all kinds of conceptual analyses. As we have seen, paraphrase is a form of analysis that is not rooted into analyticity, so this type of analysis is not simply deniable by the desertion of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

### III. *Are there indeed authentic paraphrases?*

The version of conceptual analysis offered by Jackson is viable to the extent that it is based on paraphrase as understood for the Quinean. But does this notion of paraphrase really describe a genuine activity realized inside and outside philosophy? We think so. Recall that Quine does not believe that the *definition* registering activity is an exclusive procedure to the philologist. He says in *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* that “Philosophers and scientists frequently have occasion to ‘define’ a recondite term by paraphrasing it into terms of a more familiar vocabulary.”<sup>44</sup> Similarly, Jackson believes that analysis is a current methodology that does not just matter to the philosopher, since its purpose is not to innovate the meaning of a term by replacing it with another meaning. All the same, Quine holds that analyses are like “(...) what we all do every day in paraphrasing sentences to avoid ambiguity.”<sup>45</sup> According to him, in no way para-

<sup>43</sup> Putnam, *The Analytic and...*, cit., p. 67.

<sup>44</sup> Quine, *Two Dogmas of...*, cit., p. 24.

<sup>45</sup> Quine, *Word and Object...*, cit., p. 159.

phrase should be confused with synonymy, because when we paraphrase a sentence to resolve its ambiguity, “what we seek is not a synonymous sentence, but one that is more informative by dint of resisting some alternative interpretations.”<sup>46</sup> In the course of genuinely paraphrasing a notion, this one must get expanded given that the paraphrase is richer than the paraphrased notion. The concept of ‘definition’ of which Quine talked about refers to the labor of paraphrasing ordinary words and sentences in terms of a given theory, and vice versa. In these cases, he says, “(...) we want to apply the theory to particular sentences of ordinary language, to transform those sentences into a ‘canonical form’ adapted to the theory.”<sup>47</sup> Paraphrasing provides clarity on the ambiguity of a given sentence when it is put in the words of more familiar expressions<sup>48</sup>. So, according to these parameters Jackson structures his notion of analysis based on the practical dismissal of the analytic/synthetic distinction, given that a term is not clarified, really, by cognitive synonymy or through the conceptual identity of the terms that are involved in a given conceptual analysis.

*The product of analysis: overcoming G. E. Moore's paradox of analysis*

After all, if there is an authentic analysis done by paraphrase it must have a product, *something* that is left by it. The methodology of paraphrase is not just the same as squishing lemons but, more accurately, as making lemonade: one needs water to dilute the dense lemon juice because, otherwise, it could not be drunk. The *analysans* must involve information that is used to explain the content of the *analysandum* in a more expansive way, this is, something which is seen as not previously considered at the time of the beginning of the analysis, since it is not exactly the same content the one that features in the *analysans* once the analysis is done. In other words, what *has been* analyzed is not formed *afterwards* in the exact same way once the analysis is completed. Otherwise, we would be dealing with an analysis through the sameness of meaning or synonymy.

However, according to Moore analysis in principle should not involve the acquisition of any sort of knowledge or any additional information as both *analysandum* and *analysans*, in a sense, are the same concept<sup>49</sup>. Indeed, one may ask: do *analysandum* and *analysans* express the same concept in a

<sup>46</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 158.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Arthur, P., *Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, USA, Open Court, ed. Schilpp, 1968, vol. IV, p. 665.

genuine analysis? The affirmative response to this question is equivalent to assert that analysis involves the conceptual identity of different terms. If this is so, then the content of the *anahysans* should not be either wider or narrower in relation to the content that is present in the *anahysandum*. Recall that, according to Moore<sup>50</sup>, the term used for the *anahysandum* must be a different expression from the one used for the *anahysans*, in the sense that the expression for the *anahysans* should only mention expressly concepts that are not explicitly mentioned by the expression that is used for the *anahysandum*. It is assumed that the former corresponds to a description of an analytic judgment: what is supposedly required for an analytic statement is an analysis that involves a conceptual identity proposition disguised as a synthetic statement. Thus, once such a sentence is analyzed it is found that it involves the *intention* of identifying conceptually *anahysandum* with *anahysans*. This assumption comes from Moore's adherence to the traditional conception of analysis as a conceptual decomposition that establishes logical equivalences among sentences.

Now there, we argue that the proposed conceptual analysis through paraphrase eludes successfully the paradox of analysis since the concepts employed to express the *anahysans* are different from the concept or concepts that are used to express the *anahysandum*. The concepts employed for the *anahysans* are not expressed explicitly or implicitly by the *anahysandum*. Yet, paraphrases clarify the terms that occupy the position of the *anahysandum* in virtue of the 'supervenience-link' that they have with the terms of the vocabulary in which the concepts of the *anahysans* are expressed. This link must not be regarded as a mysterious bond underlying concepts permanently. If we are to 'translate' a term into another group of terms with the purpose of disambiguating it, to make clear its multiple meanings in order to indicate the sense to which we are making reference, it does not seem to be something strange happening there. By paraphrasing, the philologist, philosopher and scientist account for a bond of supervenience and similarity between the *anahysandum* and *anahysans*. The original expressions are thus re-stated with terms from elsewhere vocabularies so that the meaning of the *anahysandum* is traduced approximately through other concepts than the concept which figures in the *anahysandum*.

In the context of acknowledging the features of a genuine paraphrase we note that, once a term, phrase or sentence **B** does not express the same concept nor part of the same concept that a term, phrase or sentence **A** expresses, it makes no sense to expect that analysis is

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Moore, G. E., *Principia Ethica*, USA, Cambridge University Press, (1903), §13.

responsible for establishing the identity of the conceptual content of **A** and **B**. Unlike what Moore thought then, analysis is not a decomposition that involves conceptual identity statements. Therefore, it does not make sense to characterize analysis as the production of either a synthetic or an analytic judgment: if analysis is a paraphrase, it is not seen as a sequence of conceptual identity propositions.

Analysis through paraphrase does not just elude the paradox of analysis; it actually solves it. The question is whether, in fact, analysis through paraphrase is correct and yet informative. We know that, in principle, analyses through the sameness of meaning or cognitive synonymy—which are two instances of analyses of conceptual identity propositions—are not correct and simultaneously informative. In contrast, analysis through paraphrase is informative (and thus useful) given that it does not presuppose that it is the same concept the one that features in the *analysandum* and in the *analysans*, unlike the conceptual identity analysis as it was conceived by Moore among many others. Again, it is fundamental to paraphrase the fact that the terms that express the *analysandum* and the *analysans* involve different concepts. This kind of analysis only seeks to approximate, to a greater or lesser extent, distinct concepts that are in a sense already near to each other. Thus, given the inequality between the meaning of the terms or between the concepts expressed by the terms corresponding to the *analysandum* and the *analysans*, the paraphrase addresses the task of clarifying recondite terms appealing to more familiar terms; even more, is also arguable the contrary, i.e. that there can be analysis of familiar terms appealing to terms less close to us. These clarifications are possible given the supervenience of the vocabulary of the term employed in the *analysandum* upon the vocabulary in which the *analysans* is expressed. The objective of those clarifications is to explain, clarify or make a translation of a term into other group of terms with different meanings. Again, the results of analyses are not gained through conceptual-decomposition processes. Instead, analysis addresses the similarities that can be established between concepts only to an approximate level, enough so that the link between *analysandum* and *analysans* allows us to keep track of a probable purpose of a term that occupies the *analysandum*. Therefore, a genuine analysis through paraphrase is not tautological or trivial but, rather, correct and informative at once.

The product of paraphrase is a conceptual synthesis, namely, an unknown link between more or less known concepts that are held together by similarity and proximity: a worthy product. According to the thesis whereby analysis through paraphrase has a genuine product, we give an interpretation

consistent with the requirements that Quine thinks that must be satisfied in order to make a correct paraphrase. By way of conclusion, the conceptual analysis synthesizes something that should not be considered (necessarily) as a 'philosophical' statement. It will be rather a *conceptual synthesis* the product of analysis, that is, a new concept. When the notion of conceptual analysis is understood appropriately it is not merely trivial. If it is informative, a paraphrase surely can be correct. But in which informative cases are paraphrases correct? We tentatively know so far that genuine analyses through paraphrases are not merely trivial. Yet, are they still correct?

### *The correction of analysis*

Kant said that there can be no analysis without synthesis. He noticed that conceptual syntheses precede conceptual analyses, and that the uses of concepts precede conceptual syntheses<sup>51</sup>. This was due to the fact that the use of conceptual designations precedes their eventual definition<sup>52</sup>. Analysis is viewed by Kant as the reconstruction of the relationships that constitute or synthesize concepts, so it is concerned with the re-effectuation of a synthesis. 'Analysis' and 'synthesis' refer to one another in the sense that the first presupposes the second, given that the understanding cannot dissolve something that has not been yet combined<sup>53</sup>. But analysis and synthesis can only reach complete accuracy in mathematics<sup>54</sup>. Kant knew that outside of mathematics analyses could only be approximate, that is, more or less appropriate images of concepts. Given that only in mathematics can concepts be precisely defined, there cannot be complete analyses outside mathematics. Then, analysis and synthesis of concepts that are not mathematical in character can get clarified only to a certain degree. Indeed, Kant thought that outside mathematics, where concepts are not explicitly defined, it is not possible to say with certainty whether a sentence is to be conceived as analytic or synthetic<sup>55</sup>. Now, what we propose to highlight in the kantian image of analysis and synthesis is the interdependence of analysis and synthesis in the determination of the meaning of concepts (outside and inside of mathematics). But, avoiding the debate of whether only in mathematics can one

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Kant, I., *Crítica de la razón pura*, Madrid, Alfaguara, 1988, p. 548.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Heymann, E., "Análisis, síntesis y determinación conceptual. Acerca del carácter de los enunciados filosóficos en la teoría kantiana de la experiencia", 2013. This article is included in the present *Episteme NS* Volume.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Kant, *Crítica de la ...*, cit., p. 152.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 548.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibidem*.



speak of 'analytic judgments', it can be argued, moreover, that conceptual analysis is proposed here in order to reconstruct approximately the probable way we create or synthesize concepts. According to Kant, conceptual analysis takes into consideration the complex of anthropological and institutional relationships that are presupposed by the use of concepts<sup>56</sup>. The purpose of the reconstruction of those relationships is to put forward institutional and anthropological relationships underlying the practices by which humans relate to each other, given the different interests and necessities they have and may have. Then, it is a matter of making a small step to assert that conceptual analysis is to a certain extent a pragmatic business, provided that it is linked to interests and abilities of humans. For its part, the result of analysis can be seen as the result of the recognition of 'privileged paths'<sup>57</sup> in the relationships that different conceptual structures or frameworks have with each other according to the precedent use of concepts that enables the determination or syntheses of concepts.

But while it is true that you can do several analyses of concepts, it is not true that *any* conceptual analysis is valid. In our view, this is due to the fact that conceptual analysis is motivated by a probable purpose that precedes it; this is, by a conceptual synthesis. Kant says that analysis is responsible for keeping track of the formation of concepts. It is also true that only by analyzing concepts we can highlight the synthesis by means of which they get constituted<sup>58</sup>. This interdependence between analysis and synthesis explains thus why it is not the case that any analysis is valid: where it has been reconstructed in a worst way a concept's formation, a perhaps genuine analysis is not correct. Assuming that conceptual analysis keeps track of the synthesis or conceptual determination, analysis through paraphrase is correct as you actually approach the different probable ways whereby different concepts where synthesized or determined in speech. The paraphrase of concepts is about elucidating the manner in which knowledge of the use of concepts occurs. Since it is not properly the determination of concepts but an ulterior procedure the one that analyses seek to perform, analysis is a reflection on the conceptual relationships that make possible the knowledge of language itself. This reflection is effective when you know what signs apply to which things, and when you know what adjectives apply to what properties, etc.

The former characterization of paraphrase is not dissimilar to the one that Jackson has made of conceptual analysis. It is clear that only by know-

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Heymann, *Análisis, síntesis y ...*, cit.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Márquez, L., 2013. This paper is included in the present *Episteme NS* volume.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Heymann, *Análisis, síntesis y ...*, cit.

ing the linguistic apparatus can there be true sentences to be stated about the world. Then, there are as much possible conceptual analyses as approximate correct elucidations about our concepts can be coherently put forward. So, if there are analyses that can be discarded since their approximation to a probable use of concept is not enough, at first glance it is possible to say that informative analyses *can* be 'correct', or 'effective', or just 'useful'. On the other hand, we are not here in the need to dispose of paraphrase as trivial because it is not restricted to the 'pure transformation' of analytic truths into other such supposed truths, or into logical truths. Thus we are not obliged to reject the possibility whereby analysis turns out to be correct and informative at the same time, because if it only pursues an approach to a probable use for a term or terms, and it can never fully establish the identification between *analysandum* and *analysans*, it may well be correct and non-trivial.

To put things in different words: analysis through paraphrase is fallible. Since a paraphrase offers a re-statement that includes distinct concepts about the one that features in the *analysandum*, the rapprochement of *analysans* and *analysandum* goes to a point, which means that analysis is never certain. If it could be done 'fully', this would imply that *analysans* and *analysandum* express the same concept. Thus one would incur in the paradox of analysis because analysis would be tautological. Now again, a paraphrase can be fallible and correct simultaneously. Hence, analysis through paraphrase is not merely trivial: it can just be better or worse than other analyses, or more or less useful, because the 'repetition', say, by which we re-express the content of a term, is not *literally* a repetition. As the paraphrase does not depend on the premise by which *analysandum* and *analysans* are different terms that involve the same concept, analysis can and should never be exact but only approximate. This is why this kind of analysis is subject to falsification: because, after all, it does not try to trivially show conceptual identities that would not involve any new information. Analysis by paraphrase is inaccurate in many cases, and in contrast to those cases we know of some cases that successfully link different concepts in order to explain a given concept. Traditionally, it is known that Euclid defined 'line' as the shortest distance that there is between two points. It is quite clear that 'shortest' and 'distance' are terms which belong to the physics vocabulary, but, either way, they helped thus to clarify the geometrical concept of 'line'. Another example to consider is the analysis that John Searle makes of the 'to promise' concept in his *Speech Acts*<sup>59</sup>. There, he makes an analysis of the illocutionary

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Searle, J., *Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, USA, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

act of promising through listing the conditions that are necessary for the act of promising to be successful, taking collective this set of conditions as a sufficient condition for such an act to be given successfully rather than in a defectible way<sup>60</sup>.

In conclusion, our interest here is to show that once analysis is understood as a paraphrase, the paradox of analysis is dissolved because there are not two contradictory alternatives that lead to the paradox. Rather, if the paraphrase is correct, then it is necessarily informative. If it is not informative, then it will be 'wrong' but only to the extent that it is not an authentic paraphrase. To resolve the paradox of analysis we use the criticism that many philosophers have made to analyticity with the purpose of thereby denying the two contradictory alternatives that guide to the paradox. We decline the assumption according to which, if analysis is correct, then it should be tautological, and the other supposition by which, conversely, if analysis is informative then it is wrong. As analysis is not 'right in principle' when it involves analytic statements or propositions of conceptual identity, it is obviously true that analysis can only be correct if it at least involves the link between two different notions. Therefore, we claim that analysis based on analyticity or conceptual identity (sameness of meaning) is incorrect by default, while analysis based on paraphrase can only be 'right' or 'wrong' when the sentence-product that it offers is not tautological (this is, when it expresses an informative statement).

Since the result of a genuine analysis is a synthesis, such synthesis can be *incomplete* or *inappropriate* in regard to the information that it supplies, i.e. it can omit important information that is present in the *analysandum*, or it can change radically the meaning of it. In the first place, the concepts associated with the *analysandum* are well away from it, and so the paraphrase is incorrect given that the *analysans* is not proximate enough. In the second place, the concepts in the *analysans* are not related (i.e. they are not similar) to the ones which feature in the *analysandum*, and thus, they do not possess coincident features –so to speak– with the concepts in the *analysandum*. In the first case, analysis fails to meet the 'approximation requirement', and in the second case, the 'resemblance requirement'. We should explore into both of these requisites in another place.

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<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

